SEE ALSO NAZARITE; NAZIRITE AND OTHERS

The reasoning first:
And a few others added to WikiPedia today, that day,
and yesterday, and again today. SEE ALSO NAZARITE.

By definition of the terms where links were added, all hold some ascetic living value and of coarse a modern term is a "hermit".
From there I add the definitions I followed and the etymologys I looked up; then I add a brief excerrpt from/of Meyerson's works.
Finale, those having read other blog posts may see where in a further distant I may have started here instead.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hermitage
her·mit·age (hûrˈmĭ-tĭj)
noun
a. The habitation of a hermit or group of hermits.
b. A monastery or abbey.
A place where one can live in seclusion; a retreat.
The condition or way of life of a hermit.
Western Christian Tradition- a domestic range, suitable for the ascetic way of living of the inhabitant.

Origin: Middle English, from Old French hermitage, from heremite, hermit; see hermit .
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hermitage_(religious_retreat)
hermitages Religious practices, behaviors, experiences, types of worship, and so on.
inhabit late 14c., from O.Fr. enhabiter "dwell in" (12c.), from L. inhabitare, from in- "in" + habitare "to dwell," frequentative of habere "hold, have" (see habit).
habitat 1762, as a technical term in Latin texts on English flora and fauna, lit. "it inhabits," third person singular present indicative of habitare "to live, dwell," frequentative of habere "to have, to hold, possess" (see habit). General sense of "dwelling place" is first attested 1854.
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O27-inhabit.html

http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O27-in2.html

http://www.encyclopedia.com/searchresults.aspx?q=assim

http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Emile_Meyerson.aspx#1-1G2:3446801313-full
Meyerson's philosophy was offered not as a philosophy of nature but as a "philosophy of the intellect." He set himself the tasks of disentangling the principles that govern the advance of thought and of extracting from reason the kernel that constitutes the intellectus ipse. This search for the a priori, he held, this new critique of pure reason, should not itself be conducted in an a priori manner. It had to proceed empirically—not directly, through a psychological analysis of the activity of thought, but indirectly, through reflection on the products of thought. These products may be true or false, so long as they bear witness to a serious effort of the intellect. From this point of view, the history of the sciences provides unique documentation. Thus it is that, of Meyerson's three major works, the first (Identité et réalité, Paris, 1908) is almost exclusively epistemological; but in the second, De l'explication dans les sciences (Explanation in the sciences; 2 vols., Paris, 1921), and especially in the third, Du cheminement de la pensée (The ways of thought; 3 vols., Paris, 1931), the scope is widened to encompass the whole of knowledge. In the last two works it is shown that the mind works always and everywhere in the same fashion, and this catholicity of reason proves that it does indeed include a portion that is a priori.
Each of Meyerson's works begins with an attempt to dispel the positivist bias that weighed so heavily on his years of apprenticeship. Science requires the concept of thing; science searches for explanation. It is not content simply to bind together by laws the phenomena given us in sense experience in order only to predict and control them. Science tends to dissolve the qualitative datum—but only to reach behind it for a more lasting and more objective, substantial real. Science not only seeks to know the how, but also to understand the why. Its aim is speculative. Its theories are not merely edifices built of laws; they claim to reveal to us the innermost causes of things. Realism and causalism are two fundamental tendencies that, taken together, govern the entire activity of the scientist. For the scientist, "phenomenism" and "legalism," when he submits to them, are only provisional stages. His ambition is to get to the bottom of things, his ultimate purpose is an ontological one.
In what does explanation consist? It is at this point that the Meyersonian theory proper begins. In every domain, whether it be philosophy, science, or everyday life, to explain is to identify. Causality is nothing but a form of logical identity. We understand a change only when it becomes evident to us that, at bottom, nothing has happened, that the entire effect was already present in the cause—or at least that the change has been reduced to the minimum, to a simple displacement. The old adage causa aequat effectum, mechanistic theories, and chemical equations all manifest this identifying tendency. As the Eleatic paradoxes attest, we are troubled even by change of place and by the mere passage of time. Reason is satisfied only to the degree that it succeeds in eliminating time. The principle of inertia, the reversibility of mechanical phenomena, the conservation of matter and energy, the permanence and immutability of the ultimate elements, show in what direction we insistently turn as we strive for intelligibility.
Yet in a world thus rigidly set, there still remains a qualitative diversity that is the source of new attempts at identification: the elimination of "secondary qualities," the explanation of apparent differences in terms of combinations of quite similar elements from which all but geometrical properties have been removed. Thus the world is fully intelligible to us only if we succeed in assimilating it, in the final analysis, to homogeneous space. Being, like becoming, tends to turn into its opposite when our reason seeks to explain it.
But reality resists this persistent will to identify. Carnot's principle defeats any hope of eliminating time. It proves that the irreversibility of the course of time is not a subjective illusion, that the future is not interchangeable with the past, in brief, that something really does happen. Furthermore, in denying sense qualities any place in the physical world, mechanism has not thereby made them disappear. The heterogeneity of the data of sense exists unexplained and indeed inexplicable from a mechanistic point of view. In addition, atomic discontinuity puts an obstacle in the way of geometrization. Reality rejects the identity to which reason would reduce it. The real is only partly intelligible; it contains elements that are irreducible, and hence irrational. It is in fact the presence of these irrational elements, contradicting the rationalist idealism of the philosophers, that can serve to define the real in opposition to the structures erected by our thought. Thus while reason may well move from success to success in the quest for identity that essentially motivates its activities, it can never win a definitive victory. In the end, it is condemned to defeat.
Indeed, how could matters be otherwise? There is something odd and almost absurd about this endeavor of reason, for its complete success would betoken its ultimate failure. To explain reality fully would amount precisely to denying it as real, to dissolving it into a motionless and undifferentiated space, that is, into nothingness. A perfect explanation of the world would end up in acosmism. And the conflict would be met with again even if the object studied were only an ideal one, as in the case of mathematical speculation. Reasoning, even that which is apparently formal, is never tautological. Thought, at work, advances; it does not just repeat interminably that A is A. Meyerson came to emphasize more and more reason's need for something diverse to assimilate, and he tended to define reason not so much by its end, identity, as by its activity, identifying. Reason is thus essentially divided against itself. This is the epistemological paradox.
Meyerson later extended these views to other domains, from scientific reason to philosophical reason, from the modern physicist to primitive man and the medieval thinker; but they were first suggested to him by reflection upon classical science. Have the revolutions in physics served to confirm or contradict them? In La déduction relativiste (Paris, 1925), Meyerson easily showed that relativity theory was inspired throughout by the same ideal of objectivization and geometrization. Like Parmenides's sphere or René Descartes's world, Albert Einstein's universe is resorbed into space. However, quantum physics, because it sets bounds to continuity and objectivity, contains something "unassimilable." Meyerson believed, nonetheless, that quantum theory, in the interpretation given it by the Copenhagen school, was a passing "aberration," and that as soon as the physicists recognized the possibility of doing so, they would hasten to return to traditional views—a conjecture that was in part subsequently verified.
If the detail is rich, the broad outlines of Meyerson's philosophy are simple and clear. It enjoyed great prestige about 1930. Since then, it has been somewhat overshadowed by the philosophy of the scientific theorists of the Copenhagen school, although Louis de Broglie retains the high estimate of it stated in his preface to Meyerson's Essais. Meyerson's philosophy has also been neglected because of the general shift of interest among contemporary philosophers from epistemological to existential problems.
See also Descartes, René; Einstein, Albert; French Philosophy; Identity; Lalande, André; Parmenides of Elea; Zeno of Elea.
Encyclopedia entries related to "habitat"
[ image deleted]:dots while circling:(description) ...was...Searching…found these results...while searching...was...\

Perhaps the restoration of the actual sayings of Jesus should be the momentum behind what we all do... AT LEAST TO SEEK; for a knowledge base more clearly as he said Himself ...
AND ONLY SO HAVE I Searched, as I searched not knowing exactly the content or contexts (linking these searches)- this "clearly" and again "that clearly" , I saved many results "free from quoting", only some of those, if any, for review.
Searching as others may the way they see my searches -
"A Heart To Heart" I found a good read
and to add to that - Kimball College Linked
BREAK FOR (a note of ) NEWS-

Those results showing:

Critical Habitat Encyclopedia entry from: The Gale Encyclopedia of Science ...result, the few moist habitats that occur in desert...dependent on this critical habitat feature. Such moist habitats in the desert are...represent critical habitats that must be preserved...Another critical habitat feature for many species...

Habitat Fragmentation Encyclopedia entry from: Environmental Encyclopedia Habitat fragmentation The habitat of a living organism, plant, animal, or microbe, is a place...environmental conditions, where the organism lives. Net loss of habitat obviously has serious implications for the survival and well-being...

Habitat Conservation Plans Encyclopedia entry from: Environmental Encyclopedia Habitat conservation plans Protection...dependent upon preserving their habitats. This is because a habitat , or natural environment...landowners that might disturb habitats, the Act included a section outlining Habitat Conservation Plans (HCPs...

Habitat Encyclopedia entry from: The Gale Encyclopedia of Science ...included in the characterization of habitat, for instance forest, prairie, or tundra habitats on land, and littoral or pelagic ones in water. Within a given habitat there may be various micro-habitats, for example the hummocks and...

Essential Fish Habitat Encyclopedia entry from: Environmental Encyclopedia Essential fish habitat Essential Fish Habitat (EFH) is a federal...conserve and sustain the habitats that fish need to go...descriptions of essential fish habitats. The plan is a document...continuing loss of aquatic habitat posed a major longterm...

Habitat for Humanity Book article from: The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition Habitat for Humanity nonprofit ecumenical Christian...finance more housing. By the early 21st cent. Habitat had built more than 200,000 homes in more...Place to Live (1995); J. P. Baggett, Habitat for Humanity (2000).

habitat Book article from: World Encyclopedia habitat Place in which an organism normally lives. A habitat is defined by characteristic physical conditions and the presence of other organisms. See also ecosystem

Neotropical Migrants Encyclopedia entry from: Environmental Encyclopedia ...Species most vulnerable to habitat loss may be those that require large areas of continuous habitat, especially the small woodland...aquatic birds whose wetland habitats are being drained, filled...winter ranges. In addition to habitat loss, neotropical migrants...

Grouse Encyclopedia entry from: The Gale Encyclopedia of Science ...their natural and seminatural habitat to agricultural or urban...in fact can enhance, the habitat of certain species of grouse...stands and younger brushy habitats of various ages, with a great deal of edge habitat among these types. Ruffed...

Wildlife Management Encyclopedia entry from: Environmental Encyclopedia ...taken to manage the habitats they require. Habitat management can take...to protect natural habitats that have not been...reestablish tallgrass prairie habitat. Although the strategies...and manipulation of habitats, the objectives of...


hermit
early 12c., from O.Fr. (h)eremite, from L.L. ermita, from Gk. eremites, lit. "person of the desert," from eremia "desert, solitude," from eremos "uninhabited." The hermit crab (1735) was so called for its solitary habits.
hermitage
late 13c., from O.Fr. hermitage, from L. heremite (see hermit).
sea monkey
1909 as a heraldic animal, 1964 as a U.S. prop. name for brine shrimp (Artemia salina), which had been used as food for aquarium fish till they began to be marketed as pets by U.S. inventor Harold von Braunhut (d.2003), who also invented "X-Ray Specs" and popularized pet hermit crabs. He began marketing them in comic book advertisements in 1960 as "Instant Life," and changed the name to Sea Monkeys in 1964, so called for their long tails.
culdee
mid-12c., from O.Ir. cele de "anchorite," from cele "associate," sometimes "servant" + de "of God." Perhaps an attempt to translate some Latin term for "religious hermit."
eremite
c.1200, learned form of hermit (q.v.), from Church L. eremita. Since mid-17c. in poetic or rhetorical use only, except in reference to specific examples in early Church history. Related: Eremitic; eremitical.
ascetic (adj.)
1640s, from Gk. asketikos "rigorously self-disciplined," from asketes "monk, hermit," from askein "to exercise, train," originally "to train for athletic competition, practice gymnastics, exercise." The noun meaning "one of the early Christians who retired to the desert to live solitary lives of meditation and prayer" is from 1670s.
anchorite
mid-15c., "hermit (especially those of the Eastern deserts), recluse, one who withdraws from the world for religious reasons," from M.L. anchorita, from Gk. anakhoretes, lit. "one who has retired," agent noun from anakhorein "to retreat, go back, retire," from ana- "back" + khorein "withdraw, give place," from khoros "place, space, free space, room."
kil
first element in many Celtic place names, lit. "cell (of a hermit), church, burial place," from Gael. and Ir. -cil, from cill, gradational variant of ceall "cell, church, burial place," from L. cella (see cell).
Anthony
masc. proper name, from L. Antonius, name of a Roman gens (with excrescent -h- probably suggested by many Gk. loan words beginning anth-, e.g. anthros "flower," anthropos "man"); St. Anthony (4c.), Egyptian hermit, patron saint of swineherds, to whom one of each litter was usually vowed, hence Anthony for "smallest pig of the litter (1660s; in condensed form tantony pig from 1590s). St. Anthony's Fire (1520s), popular name for erysipelas, is so called from the tradition that those who sought his intercession recovered from that distemper during a fatal epidemic in 1089.
monk
O.E. munuc, from P.Gmc. *muniko- (cf. O.Fris. munek, M.Du. monic, O.H.G. munih, Ger. Mönch), an early borrowing from V.L. *monicus (cf. Fr. moine, Sp. monje, It. monaco), from L.L. monachus "monk," originally "religious hermit," from Late Gk. monakhos "monk," noun use of a classical Gk. adj. meaning "solitary," from monos "alone" (see mono-).
In England, before the Reformation, the term was not applied to the members of the mendicant orders, who were always called friars. From the 16th c. to the 19th c., however, it was usual to speak of the friars as a class of monks. In recent times the distinction between the terms has been carefully observed by well-informed writers. In Fr. and Ger. the equivalent of monk is applied equally to 'monks' and 'friars.' [OED]
H
the pronunciation "aitch" was in O.Fr. (ache), and is from a presumed L.L. *accha (cf. It. effe, elle, emme), with the central sound approximating the value of the letter when it passed from Roman to Germanic, where it at first represented a strong, distinctly aspirated -kh- sound close to that in Scottish loch. In earlier Latin the letter was called ha. In Romance languages, the sound became silent in Late Latin and was omitted in Old French and Italian, but it was restored in M.E. spelling in words borrowed from French, and often later in pronunciation, too. Thus Modern English has words ultimately from Latin with missing -h- (e.g. able, from L. habile); with a silent -h- (e.g. heir, hour); with a formerly silent -h- now vocalized (e.g. humble, honor); and even a few with an excrescent -h- fitted in confusion to words that never had one (e.g. hostage, hermit). Relics of the formerly unvoiced -h- persist in pedantic insistence on an historical (object) and in obsolete mine host. The use in digraphs (e.g. -sh-, -th-) goes back to the ancient Greek alphabet, which used it in -ph-, -th-, -kh- until -H- took on the value of a long "e" and the digraphs acquired their own characters. The letter passed into Roman use before this evolution, and thus retained there more of its original Semitic value.